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Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) have enjoyed relatively stable relations since they came into being in 1948 and
1949 respectively. The Korean War (1950-53) set the scene for future relations between
Pyongyang and Peking, given that Chinese help was vital for the survival of Kim Il-
Sung’s regime. Sino-North Korean relations experienced periods of great strain during
the 1960s and 1970s, when the Sino-Soviet conflict divided the Communist bloc into
pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese camps. However, Peking was able to take advantage of the
internal  and  external  problems  of  the  DPRK to  present  itself  as  Pyongyang’s  main
friend faced with the pressures exerted by South Korea and the West―the USA inter
alia―which occurred all the more easily after the collapse of the USSR.
2 Although,  at  the  time both regimes  were  being established,  Peking and Pyongyang
declared that a new era was dawning, neither country has been able to completely free
itself of the shackles of its historical heritage. Past Chinese domination on the Korean
peninsula still causes resentment today in North Korea. Since the death of Kim Il-Sung
(1994), China has seen a decline in its influence, although the issue of North Korea’s
nuclear programme allows it today to again play an important role in Northeast Asia.
The authorities in Peking are aware that in addition to the problems created by the
nuclear ambitions of Kim Jong-Il’s regime and the growing presence of North-Korean
refugees  on Chinese  soil,  there  is  the  issue  of  territorial  disputes  between the  two
countries.
3 China and North Korea share a 1,416-kilometre long border that corresponds broadly
speaking to the course of the Yalu and Tumen rivers. These rivers have facilitated the
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drawing up of the borders, but the agreements between the two countries have not
been without considerable tensions, mainly due to Pyongyang. North Korea resolved its
border disputes with Russia (the then USSR) in 1985-86, but its territorial problems
with China have still to be settled. A lack of proper documentation hampers study of
this question, and Pyongyang has never made its territorial claims a determining factor
of  its  foreign policy.  Most  of  our  information comes from statements  made,  under
cover  of  anonymity,  by  North  Korean  diplomats  posted  to  Third  World  countries.
Peking for its part never comments officially on the subject. Moreover, access to the
border zone has for a long time been restricted, thus preventing any in situ research.
Finally, the territorial dispute has never constituted the threat of a break in relations
between the two countries.
4 However,  in  spite  of  the  image  of  “indestructible”  friendship between  the  two
countries, the border disputes have in fact conditioned their relations since 1950. For
China, the polemic with North Korea is just one in a long line of territorial disputes
with neighbouring countries, concerning both land and maritime boundaries. Secret
negotiations between Peking and Pyongyang resulted in 1963 in an agreement that
seems to be no longer valid today. At the time, at the height of the Sino-Soviet standoff,
China adopted a flexible position in order to break out of its isolation in the Communist
bloc and to win Kim Il-Sung’s regime1 over to its cause. In spite of the CCP’s tough
stance  after  1949  in  the  face  of  the  territorial  claims  made  by  its  neighbouring
countries, Premier Zhou Enlai advised the Chinese delegation to be receptive to North
Korea’s demands. The Chinese concessions were so significant that the local authorities
in the border provinces of Jilin and Liaoning protested2.
5 The Sino-Korean border has been changed a great deal over the centuries. The Korean
kingdom of Koguryo (fifth to eighth centuries) controlled Manchuria and the region
around present-day Vladivostok. The kingdom of Parhae (eighth to tenth centuries)
that succeeded it dominated Manchuria and the Liaodong peninsula, although in the
seventh century the power of the Chinese Tang Empire had reached as far as Seoul. The
present  borders  correspond  roughly  to  those  of  the  Yuan  Empire  (1279-1368).  The
Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911) consolidated the Chinese domination of the North-
eastern region. At the time, Korea was a satellite state of China, subject to the authority
of the “Son of Heaven”, and the kings in Seoul were in no position to oppose Chinese
demands. Yet, in the nineteenth century, a period of decline for the Chinese empire,
Korea  made  its  displeasure  known  and  Seoul  called,  albeit  unsuccessfully,  for  the
restitution of territories formerly under Korean domination. However, China’s defeat at
the hands of Japan in 1895 and Tokyo’s gradual domination on the Korean peninsula
put an end to any possibility of agreement.
6 North Korea often maintains that the territorial squabble has its origins in the relations
of dependency between Korea and China in the period of the Manchu Qing dynasty,
even though the Han, the main ethnic group of the “Middle Kingdom”, were not in
power. China, however, considers that the territories acquired in the past are no longer
subject to further discussion today,  especially if  this  should threaten the territorial
integrity of the People’s Republic.
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Paektusan, the “Sacred Mountain”
7 The principal border dispute between Peking and Pyongyang concerns Mount Paektu3.
This is the region’s highest peak, a 2,744-metre high volcano lying at the source of the
Yalu and Tumen rivers. At the bottom of the crater lies a lake, 13 kilometres square and
204 metres deep, the Chongji4.  Mount Paektu is part of the Changbaishan mountain
range (“eternally white mountains” in Chinese), that crosses in a north-south direction
the prefectures of Antu, Wusong and Changbai, in the south of Jilin province, stretching
over 80 kilometres and ending inside Korea’s borders5.
8 The Qing emperor Kangxi (1662-1723) forced Korea, which at the time was a vassal state
of China, to accept that the border separating the two countries should pass through
the Paektusan peak. The region in which the volcano is situated is regarded as the
cradle of the Manchu people. The squabble over Mount Paektu resurfaced under King
Kojong (1864-1907), from the Korean Yi dynasty, but the Japanese occupation of the
Korean peninsula put an end to any possibility of compromise. 
9 The zone surrounding the volcano is inhospitable and uninhabited, and neither the
Koreans nor the Chinese have tried to develop the region economically. The territory
claimed by Pyongyang concerns 33 square kilometres around the Paektusan summit. In
the case of Lake Chongji,  the 1963 agreement established that three-fifths would be
under North Korea’s control with the remaining two-fifths belonging to China.
10 In 1965, the standoff between China and the Soviet Union put North Korea in a very
tight situation. Pyongyang needed the help of both countries: owing its existence to the
former and its survival to the latter. Kim Il-Sung’s criticism of any deviation in the
international communist movement was very badly received by Peking and tensions
mounted between Kim and Mao. In order to punish the North Korean regime for its
lack of support, China is thought to have demanded that the 160 square kilometres
around Paektusan be conceded to it as compensation for the economic and military aid
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provided by Peking during the Korean War (1950-53)6.  China abandoned its claim in
November 1970 in order to improve relations with Pyongyang7. Between March 1968
and  March  1969,  various  military  skirmishes  took  place  in  the  Paektusan  region
between the North Korean and Chinese armed forces. These were consequences of the
tensions caused by the Cultural Revolution and the savage criticisms made of Kim Il-
Sung by the Red Guards. During these years of unrest, Peking closed its border with its
neighbour.
11 For the Koreans, Mount Paektu is entwined with their earliest history. According to
legend, the God Hwanung (“the king come from the sky”) landed on the volcano to
couple with a woman who then conceived a son, Tangun (“the king of the birch-tree”),
who in 2333 B.C. founded the kingdom of Choson, regarded as being the first Korean
state.
12 Furthermore,  for  the  communist  authorities  of  North  Korea,  Mount  Paektu  is  the
“sacred mountain of the revolution”, the place of the most important guerrilla exploits
in the 1930s under the command of Kim Il-Sung. After Mangyongdae, the village in
which Kim was born, the volcano is without doubt the most venerated place in the
DPRK.  One  of  the  best-known photographs  of  the  former  leader  shows  him at  the
summit of Paektusan contemplating Lake Chongji. This is proof of the North Korean
desire to affirm its pre-eminence over this territory. An image of Mount Paektu also
decorates the main façade of the Korean Museum of the Revolution in Pyongyang, an
enormous  building  that  was  constructed  to  the  glory  of  the  Great  Leader’s
revolutionary past. 
13 The volcano’s importance for the regime is such that North Korean propaganda affirms
that Kim Jong-Il was born in a guerrilla camp on the Korean face of Mount Paektusan in
February 1942. In actual fact, the present North Korean leader was born in the military
camp of Vyatsk, near the city of Khabarovsk in the Russian Far-East, where his father
was an officer in the Red Army. The goal of this manipulation is clear: to situate the
birth  of  the  communist  dictator  on  Korean  soil  and  in  a  symbolic  place  that  is
representative of the consciousness of the Korean people8.  The DPRK’s leaders even
invented the exact  spot  of  his  birth that  has  since become a  place of  worship and
pilgrimage9. 
14 To justify its control over a part of Paektusan, Peking talks about compensation for its
military support of North Korea during the 1950-53 conflict. For some time now Peking
has been constantly referring to its concern for the protection of the region’s natural
environment and for the development of the volcano as a tourist attraction10. China has
a final argument to justify its control over Paektusan, which is that while the volcano
may be sacred for Koreans, it is also sacred for Manchus11. Hiding behind the defence of
the  interests  of  Manchus,  Peking  rules  out  any  negotiations  that  could  lead  to
territorial loss in the area.
The Yalu and Tumen Rivers, and control of the seas
15 Since  1949,  China  and North Korea  have  accepted that  the  course  of  the  Yalu  and
Tumen rivers constitute the border between the two countries. However, they have
refused  to  situate  the  demarcation  line  in  the  middle  of  the  rivers,  adopting  the
principle of joint ownership, management and use of the two waterways.
16 Historically, the main problem has been over the dozens of islands that are to be found
in the rivers. China has recognised North Korea’s sovereignty over 80% of these islands,
including  the  biggest  ones.  Ownership  of  the  islands  has  been  determined  by  the
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nationality of their population, but the problem has not been resolved at all for the
uninhabited islands,  a  sort  of  shared responsibility  seeming to  apply  in  their  case.
Pidan (Chouduandao in Chinese), located at the mouth of the Yalu, was, however, an
exception.  The island was  originally  inhabited by  mainly  Chinese,  and while  North
Korea had control over it, Peking officially regarded it as an integral part of its own
territory. The North Koreans then wished to make a gift of it to China in gratitude for
its  help  in  1950-53.  In  the  event,  this  did  not  happen,  and,  in  1963,  the  Chinese
authorities  had  to  evacuate  the  approximately  fifty  families  who  were  still  living
there12.
17 The river banks are also the subject of discussions, although both parties recognise that
they  serve  as  a  line  of  demarcation  between  the  two  Communist  states.  Peking  is
showing  tolerance  towards  the  North  Korean  claims,  yet  without  giving  in  to
Pyongyang. The Chinese acceptance of North Korean control of 90% of the mouth of the
Yalu  was  badly  received  by  the  local  authorities  in  the  Chinese  border  provinces,
despite the state of free navigation stipulated by Peking. Management of the river ports
has also been a factor of dispute. Finally, in October 2000, both countries reached an
agreement on the border ports and their joint management13. In point of fact, friction
over the control  of  the banks of  the Yalu and Tumen explain the great  number of
agreements  and  protocols  signed  by  Peking  and  Pyongyang:  for  example,  the
agreement  on  the  management  of  the  railway  line  running  along  the  Yalu,  on
navigation  and  the  electricity  produced  by  both  rivers,  the  floating  of  timber
downstream, the common management of the Unbong hydroelectric plant, etc.
18 Another  polemic  of  significance  concerns  the  island  of  Shindo  (Shin  in  Chinese),
situated in the estuary of the Yalu River. In spite of Chinese claims, Shindo has for a
long time belonged to Korea, and under Japanese occupation was a production centre
for raw materials for textiles, as the place is covered in reeds. The Chinese authorities
regard the island as a station of major importance for transport and communication in
the development of oil extraction in the Gulf of Beihai. For Pyongyang, ownership of
the  island  favours  its  strategic  position  at  the  mouth  of  a  river  that  serves  as  a
boundary-mark between the two countries14.
19 Another element of tension is the question of access to the Sea of Japan. Although the
DPRK borders China along the greater part of its northern boundary, the last portion of
the River Tumen (17 kilometres exactly)  marks the limit  between North Korea and
Russia, thus depriving the Chinese of any opening onto the Sea of Japan. For China, not
having any supply post for its war fleet in this zone puts a major break on its political
and military presence in North Asia.
20 The 1985-86 and 1991 agreements between Russians and North Koreans on demarcating
their borders are of vital interest for China, which is very concerned by the recognition
of its navigation rights on the Tumen River as far as the Sea of Japan. The accords
signed by Tsarist Russia and Imperial China in 1858 (Aigun Treaty) and 1860 (Peking
Treaty)  recognise  Russia’s  possession  of  eastern  Siberia  and  the  extension  of  its
territory as far as the Amour and Tumen rivers, but they also establish China’s right to
cross the Tumen in order to have access to the Sea of Japan. Moscow and Pyongyang
have  never  denied  China  this  right,  but  they  have  rarely  shown  any  co-operative
attitude  either.  For  Pyongyang,  Chinese  access  to  the  Sea  of  Japan  threatens  its
independence.  The  improvement  in  relations  between  the  Chinese  and  Russian
authorities  during  the  1990s  enabled  a  rapprochement  and  the  signing  of  several
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agreements.  The  most  recent  one,  a  protocol  signed in  Peking  on  June  20th  2003,
concerns the junction of the Chinese, Russian and North Korean borders on the river
Tumen15. The main problem for China in this whole question is not, however, political,
but rather of a natural kind: the Tumen’s waters are known today for their shallowness,
thereby making navigation difficult16.
21 A final  issue is  that  of  maritime boundaries.  In  July  1977,  North Korea unilaterally
introduced an economic and fishing exclusion zone of 200 miles off the coast of the
Yellow Sea and, since that time the two countries have not yet settled the question of
this  maritime  boundary17.  For  Peking,  the  North  Korean  position  is  stalling  the
economic development of the mouth of the Yalu and, in particular, of the Gulf of Beihai.
22 The territorial issue is without doubt an element of tension between China and North
Korea. However, neither Pyongyang nor Peking has ever had their relations depend on
resolution of the border disputes, in spite of a few violent incidents in the late 1960s.
The issue is annoying for the North Korean regime, but not to the extent of risking a
breakdown  in  relations.  Since  the  1980s,  Pyongyang  has  not  sought  to  bring  the
territorial issue to the fore. Accused of developing a nuclear arsenal, seriously affected
by a  famine since  1995-96  and with increasing economic  difficulties,  the  DPRK can
hardly dictate conditions to China. Its dependence on Peking has increased since the
1980s, to the point where, in 1997, North Korea’s debt to the PRC exceeded US$500
million18.
23 Resolution of the territorial disputes appears to be no easy matter. China is unwilling to
negotiate, given its position of force. North Korea, on the other hand, could play the
card of the 1985-86 agreements reached with Russia, both with regard to case of the
Tumen and Yalu rivers and to the delimitation of the maritime territory. Those accords
laid out the boundary between the two countries as being in the middle of the Tumen.
The few islands there are there have been placed under Korean control. Peking has
studied the Russo-North Korean accords as a starting point for any future negotiations
with  Pyongyang.  In  the  case  of  maritime boundaries,  the  Russo-North  Korean
agreement stipulates a belt of 300 nautical miles starting from the Tumen River that
separates Moscow’s  geopolitically  and economically  interesting zones from those of
Pyongyang.
24 The Russian example is important, but there are differences with respect to the Chinese
case. In 1986-87, the Soviet authorities had accepted most of North Korea’s claims in
exchange for an improvement in relations between the two countries.  The political
changes at the top of the USSR (Mikhaïl Gorbatchev as supreme leader and Edouard
Chevarnadze  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs)  no  doubt  facilitated  these  accords.  In
addition, the dispute between the Russians and the North Koreans was limited to a
small part of the Tumen River and the maritime zone, whereas, in the Chinese case, the
disagreement  is  over  geographical  realities  (the  Yalu  and  Tumen  rivers,  and  their
islands)  as  well  as  economic  ones,  and  also  brings  Korean  nationalism  into  play
(Paektusan).
25 Nonetheless, a rapprochement between the two countries is possible, as shown by the
example of the Supung Dam, 90 kilometres upstream from the mouth of the Yalu. Built
during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in the 1930s,  this one hundred-metre
high dam belonged to China, being physically located in Liaoning Province. It was to
enable control of the waterway as far as the river mouth. Its power station, constructed
on the Korean side of the Yalu, had the capacity to provide electricity for the whole of
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Korea and Manchuria19. This station, which was damaged in the early 1940s by floods,
remained for a long time inoperative, in spite of China’s regular proposal of a financial
collaboration that was always rejected by North Korea. Today, it has been rebuilt and
Supung Dam is one of Asia’s largest, being 160 metres high and 853 metres long. It now
provides electricity to the neighbouring industrial zones of China and North Korea.
26 Economic development can also work in favour of dispute resolution. The North Korean
border zone with China and Russia now houses the project of economic development of
Ranjing-Sonbong, and other border areas (like Sinuiji) have also become development
zones over the past few years.
27 The border disputes between China and North Korea are bringing about a joining of
forces between the authorities and citizens, especially in the case of Korea. Pyongyang
has always tried to avoid tensions with its neighbour over Paektusan. Nonetheless, ever
since 1948, the year in which the DPRK was founded, it has been fostering a nationalism
aimed at China among others, denouncing the latter’s imperialist past that had turned
Korea into a vassal state of the Manchu emperors. By using the polemic on the non-
determination of borders,  Pyongyang is bolstering this xenophobic nationalism that
serves it both to display its independence from Peking, which it has in fact often called
upon  in  the  course  of  the  past  half-century,  and  to  cover  up  the  serious  internal
problems.
28 Pyongyang has the support of South Korea in this conflict. The authorities in Seoul are
willingly lending their weight to the North Koreans in their territorial claims. This is
one of the few points of agreement quickly reached by both Korean governments. In
fact,  Paektusan  may  be  regarded  as  a  symbol  of  national  unity.  Its  name  is  even
mentioned  in  the  first  verse  of  the  Republic  of  Korea’s  national  anthem.  Today,
however, South Koreans can only gain access to the Paektusan area from the Chinese
side.  Seoul’s  attitude  can  also  be  explained  by  a  strategic  factor:  a  possible  future
reunification of the peninsula would have to deal with these problems. For its part,
Pyongyang is backing South Korea in its claim to regain Tok Island in the Sea of Japan,
called Takeshima by the Japanese, who are also claiming ownership of it.
29 China, for its part, periodically publishes books and maps affirming the appropriation
of  territories  even  though  they  may  still  be  being  disputed  by  other  countries,
particularly North Korea20.  The authorities in Pyongyang have identical  propaganda
tactics  and  widely  display  images  of  Kim  Jong-Il  and  his  father  on  top  of  Mount
Paektusan. In spite of the pressures, Peking’s leaders have been able to take the heat
out of the territorial demands of the North Koreans by playing the card of Chinese aid
to the Pyongyang regime. Chinese military aid was fundamental in the early 1950s for
the survival of Kim Il-Sung and his comrades from the Korean Workers’ Party. Although
Pyongyang attempted to play two hands at once in dealing with Moscow and Peking
from the 1960s to the 1980s, since the fall of the USSR China has become North Korea’s
only ally  internationally.  In this  context,  Pyongyang can scarcely adopt a  hard-line
position over possible negotiations with Peking, and for more than a decade now has
had a flexible attitude. For their part, the Chinese refuse to talk about Paektusan, and
the national press very rarely gives any coverage of the territorial problems between
the two countries.  Peking is  thus avoiding increasing tensions with Pyongyang and
inflaming nationalistic passions in South Korea.
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NOTES
1. In 1963, relations between Peking and Pyongyang were at their height. Kim Il-Sung
and Mao Zedong opposed Nikita Khrushchev whom they accused of revisionism. This
rapprochement between the Chinese and the North Koreans resulted, in November
1963, in an agreement of co-operation and exploitation of the Yalu and Tumen rivers.
This agreement also dealt with border disputes between the two countries and
recognised, among other things, North Korean control over most of the islands in the
two rivers. The agreement, which was very favourable to North Korea, was preceded by
a visit by the Chinese President Liu Shaoqi in September.
2. Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, Stanford, The Hoover Institution for
War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1996, pp. 99-100.
3. Called “Paektusan” in Korean and “Baitoushan” in Chinese, in both cases this name
means “white-headed mountain”.
4. Or “Tianchi”, the “Heavenly Lake” in Chinese.
5. Changbaishan is the largest natural reserve in China. Classified by UNESCO as a
biosphere protection area, the region contains snow leopards, Siberian tigers and black
bears, among other endangered species, and is the subject of studies by botanists,
geologists, etc.
6. Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea’s Involvement in the
Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975, The University of Alabama Press, 1978, p. 120. This
information, which was never confirmed by either the Chinese or the North Koreans,
appeared in The Indian Times of July 20th 1965, its source being a North Korean diplomat
stationed in New Delhi.
7. The abandonment of the Chinese claim was preceded by a rapprochement between
Peking and Pyongyang from the start of the 1970s. In January, both governments
signed a navigation agreement on the Yalu and Tumen rivers; in February, a new North
Korean ambassador was appointed to Peking and, a month later, a Chinese ambassador
was appointed to Pyongyang. More important still was the visit to Pyongyang in April
by Premier Zhou Enlai, the first by a top Chinese leader for seven years.
8. A dozen camps and museums have been set up in the Paektusan region to
commemorate the Korean revolution. The Korean part of the volcano, on the site of
Samjiyon, has sculptures depicting battles against the Japanese, the heroes of the
revolution, generals and representatives of the people.
9. One could also mention that, since the early 1980s the Pyongyang government has
been manufacturing a computer called Paektusan and that sporting competitions called
the Paektusan Cup are organised every year in February, in celebration of Kim Jong-Il’s
birthday.
10. The Sino-North Korean dispute occasionally borders on the absurd. In the 1970s,
the Chinese news agency Xinhua announced the sighting of a monster in the region.
North Korea responded by saying that the “monster” was a black bear.
11. The Manchus are the second most populous minority in China after the Zhuang
people in the south of the country. In the 2000 census, the latest one carried out in the
country, it had 10,682 million people (Zhongguo tongji nianjian [China Statistical
Yearbook], Peking, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003, p. 48).
12. Chae-Jin Lee, op. cit., p. 100.
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13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Peking, November
18th 2000.
14. Yang Tae-jin, “Territorial Dispute between North Korea and Communist China”, 
Vantage Point, vol. VI, nº 6, 1983, pp. 1-11.
15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Peking, June 30th 2003.
16. Choon-ho Park, “River and Maritime Boundary Problems between North Korea and
Russia in the Tumen River and the Sea of Japan”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol.
V, nº 2, 1993, pp. 65-98.
17. Lee Yong-jin, “The Maritime Policy and Sea Law of North Korea”, Vantage Point, vol.
IX, nº 7, 1986, pp. 1-10.
18. David Reese, The Prospects for North Korea’s Survival, London, International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1998, p. 76.
19. Yang Tae-jin, op. cit., page 6.
20. The Chinese authorities have the support of Taipei. China has a Korean minority of
about two million who live in the border provinces of Jilin (including the autonomous
prefecture of Yanbian), Heilongjiang and Liaoning. The Chinese Koreans have always
avoided any discord with Peking over the territorial issue with Pyongyang. See
Sébastien Colin, “A Border Opening onto Numerous Geopolitical Issues. The Yanbian
Korean Autonomous Prefecture”, China Perspectives, No. 48, July-August 2003, pp. 4-20.
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